The case for narrative by Beatty, A
	   110	  
4	  The	  case	  for	  narrative	  	  
	  
A	  woman	  stands	  outside	  a	  tent	  on	  a	  plain,	  dust	  blowing	  in	  her	  face.	  She	  looks	  
ahead	  but	  her	  gaze	  is	  unfocused,	  her	  mouth	  half-­‐open.	  Something	  important	  has	  
happened;	  but	  the	  look	  shows	  expectation	  as	  well	  as	  reaction	  (the	  tears	  are	  half-­‐
checked).	  Her	  eyes	  are	  narrowed,	  her	  face	  taut.	  Whatever	  she	  sees	  is	  not	  the	  
simple	  object	  of	  her	  emotion.	  We	  recognize	  apprehension,	  perhaps	  fear	  or	  regret.	  
Trained	  in	  other	  expressions,	  we	  might	  have	  difficulty	  with	  Kazakh	  faces	  and	  
with	  unfamiliar	  voice-­‐tones;	  yet	  the	  story	  that	  has	  brought	  us	  to	  this	  point	  
supplies	  what	  we	  need	  to	  know.	  The	  woman’s	  husband,	  a	  gruff	  shepherd,	  has	  
just	  had	  a	  fierce	  quarrel	  with	  her	  brother—back	  from	  service	  in	  the	  navy—who	  
demands	  a	  greater	  share	  in	  the	  running	  of	  things.	  Home	  from	  the	  sea	  but	  out	  of	  
his	  depth,	  his	  knowledge	  meaningless	  on	  the	  steppe,	  the	  brother	  cannot	  have	  a	  
herd	  of	  his	  own	  until	  he	  gets	  a	  wife;	  and	  on	  the	  windswept	  plain	  there	  is	  only	  one	  
other	  family,	  whose	  daughter	  Tulpan	  (for	  whom	  the	  film	  is	  named),	  refuses	  his	  
proposal.	  She	  is	  the	  unattainable,	  never-­‐seen	  bride	  of	  his	  dreams,	  mistress	  of	  the	  
homestead	  he	  has	  drawn	  in	  fantasy	  on	  the	  lining	  of	  his	  sailor-­‐suit	  collar.	  But	  now	  
he	  must	  knuckle	  down	  and	  submit	  to	  his	  tough	  brother-­‐in-­‐law,	  perhaps	  
remaining	  forever	  unmarried,	  or	  leave	  the	  isolated	  yurt	  for	  a	  distant	  half-­‐
mythical	  city.	  Loyal	  to	  both	  men,	  standing	  between	  them,	  the	  sister	  suddenly	  
confronts	  the	  crisis	  and	  it	  tears	  her	  soul.	  Love	  for	  her	  brother,	  disappointment	  on	  
his	  behalf,	  resentment	  of	  her	  husband,	  fears	  for	  the	  future,	  the	  apprehension	  of	  
loss.	  All	  seem	  plainly	  legible	  as	  she	  stares	  at	  the	  retreating	  figure	  of	  her	  brother	  
while	  her	  husband,	  too	  big	  for	  his	  puny	  horse,	  rides	  off	  in	  the	  other	  direction	  in	  
search	  of	  a	  lost	  sheep.	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  Our	  response,	  our	  being	  moved,	  is	  superficially	  in	  our	  reading	  of	  her	  face,	  
our	  sympathy	  a	  felt	  evaluation	  of	  her	  expression.	  So	  what	  do	  we	  read?	  It’s	  not	  a	  
matter	  of	  ‘basic	  emotions’	  (too	  few),	  ‘human	  nature’	  (too	  vague),	  or	  ‘universal	  
expressions’	  (too	  vacant),	  but	  something	  altogether	  sharper	  and	  more	  detailed:	  
the	  contexts,	  persons,	  and	  histories	  that	  produce	  the	  emotions.	  This	  is	  the	  power	  
of	  narrative.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  director	  of	  Tulpan,	  Sergey	  Dvortsevoy,	  a	  Russian	  documentary	  maker,	  
devised	  his	  quasi-­‐ethnographic	  drama	  as	  a	  ‘fiction	  film’	  because—he	  explains	  in	  
an	  interview	  in	  the	  Extras	  -­‐	  you	  cannot	  put	  such	  scenes	  in	  a	  documentary	  
without	  overexposing	  the	  subjects	  and	  betraying	  their	  private	  lives.	  Or	  so	  he	  
explains	  in	  an	  interview	  included	  in	  the	  Extras.	  Documentary	  hides	  the	  
important,	  often	  intimate	  moments.	  The	  truth,	  therefore,	  is	  in	  the	  fiction.	  But	  
fiction	  doesn’t	  exactly	  mean	  making	  it	  up.	  Dvortsevoy’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  
unstaged	  actuality	  is	  revealed	  in	  an	  unbroken	  ten-­‐minute	  sequence	  of	  a	  sheep	  
giving	  birth—surely	  the	  most	  unlikely,	  unappetizing	  climax	  ever	  put	  in	  a	  film.	  
Having	  stalked	  off	  in	  a	  huff	  after	  the	  row,	  bent	  on	  the	  city	  over	  the	  horizon,	  the	  
sailor	  comes	  upon	  a	  sick	  ewe,	  lost	  on	  the	  swirling	  plain.	  He	  approaches	  the	  
groaning	  beast	  tentatively,	  probing	  at	  arm’s	  length;	  then,	  bracing	  himself,	  hauls	  
out	  the	  limp	  black	  mucous-­‐covered	  body	  of	  a	  baby	  lamb.	  With	  an	  incredible	  
tenderness	  he	  crouches	  over	  the	  trembling	  creature,	  resuscitates	  it	  by	  mouth,	  
and	  urges	  it	  towards	  its	  mother.	  He	  is	  born	  as	  a	  shepherd.	  Exhausted,	  he	  lies	  back	  
in	  the	  dust,	  stunned	  by	  relief,	  happiness,	  awe.	  Again,	  the	  emotions	  are	  wordless,	  
minimally	  gestured	  in	  face	  and	  posture;	  but	  we	  understand.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  giving	  place	  to	  this	  surprisingly	  powerful	  scene—which	  is	  acted	  but	  real,	  
opportunistic	  in	  the	  way	  of	  true	  ethnography—the	  director	  had	  to	  reassemble	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parts	  of	  the	  story:	  the	  reality	  was	  too	  strong,	  too	  significant,	  to	  be	  truncated	  or	  
intercut	  with	  made-­‐up	  scenes.	  The	  twin	  births	  of	  sheep	  and	  shepherd	  were	  his	  
artistic	  reward.	  In	  the	  interview	  he	  stresses	  the	  universality	  and	  stark	  simplicity	  
of	  the	  lifeworld	  he	  was	  attempting	  to	  capture,	  but	  also	  its	  cultural	  specificity,	  the	  
tenderness	  behind	  the	  harshness	  of	  daily	  life,	  the	  feel	  for	  a	  unique	  landscape,	  the	  
special	  beauty	  of	  the	  particular.	  In	  all	  this	  emotions	  play	  a	  crucial	  role;	  but	  their	  
evocation	  and	  explanatory	  power	  depend	  on	  the	  precision	  of	  narrative.	  This	  is	  
what	  good	  ethnography	  can	  do.	  	  
	  
Why	  narrative	  matters	  
The	  importance	  of	  narrative	  is	  threefold:	  in	  the	  construction,	  understanding,	  and	  
reporting	  of	  emotions.	  	  
1.	  Narrative	  is	  implicated,	  firstly,	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  shape	  of	  an	  emotion	  
episode	  (or,	  as	  emotion	  sceptics	  might	  say,	  ‘in	  those	  culturally	  variable	  
collocations	  of	  situated	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and	  bodily	  stirrings	  that	  English	  
speakers	  call	  emotions’).	  In	  getting	  angry,	  we	  perceive	  an	  offence,	  take	  umbrage,	  
attribute	  blame,	  tense	  up,	  and	  prepare	  a	  response.	  In	  feeling	  ashamed,	  we	  
commit	  a	  blunder,	  prickle	  with	  awareness,	  blush	  at	  the	  judgment	  of	  others,	  and	  
beat	  a	  retreat.	  Every	  emotion	  tells	  a	  story.	  Which	  is	  why	  a	  latecomer	  stumbling	  
on	  rage	  or	  laughter	  hastens	  to	  find	  the	  cause—the	  backstory—the	  better	  to	  
follow	  the	  dénouement.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Consider	  a	  short	  sequence	  from	  the	  Tulpan	  outline:	  the	  sailor’s	  
consternation	  on	  coming	  across	  the	  lost	  sheep.	  His	  consternation	  is	  a	  product	  of	  
his	  striking	  out	  for	  the	  unknown,	  the	  lost	  sheep	  that	  thwarts	  his	  plan,	  the	  puzzle	  
of	  what	  to	  do	  next,	  and	  the	  pressure,	  knowing	  nothing,	  to	  do	  something.	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Consternation	  is	  revealed	  to	  have	  an	  ‘intentional	  structure’	  (Frijda	  1986:	  98-­‐
101)	  composed	  of	  interlinked	  expectations,	  frustrations,	  and	  resolutions.	  
(‘Intentional’	  is	  meant	  here	  in	  the	  ordinary	  sense	  of	  ‘bearing	  an	  intention’,	  not	  in	  
the	  philosophical	  sense	  of	  having	  an	  object.)	  Or	  consider	  the	  longer	  sequence,	  
marked	  by	  shifting	  emotions:	  the	  sailor’s	  wary	  approach	  to	  the	  sheep,	  his	  
determination	  to	  complete	  the	  grim	  task,	  his	  relief	  at	  the	  outcome,	  his	  joy	  at	  
what	  this	  means	  for	  his	  future	  and	  his	  newfound	  vocation.	  The	  emotions	  fit	  
together	  in	  an	  unfolding	  story,	  embedded	  within	  the	  larger	  story	  of	  life	  on	  the	  
steppe.	  The	  sequence	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  any	  of	  its	  moments	  depend	  on	  what	  went	  
before	  and	  what	  might	  come	  after,	  not	  merely	  in	  a	  succession	  of	  unrelated	  points	  
or	  even	  a	  cause-­‐effect	  chain,	  but	  as	  a	  thickening	  strand	  of	  meaning,	  feeling,	  re-­‐
appraisal,	  anticipation	  and	  implication.	  Though	  wordless,	  the	  sequence	  is	  
inherently	  narrative-­‐like	  in	  structure.	  	  
2.	  To	  understand	  the	  sequence	  or	  any	  of	  its	  linked	  emotions—to	  figure	  out	  the	  
tissue	  of	  connexion	  and	  implication—is	  to	  grasp	  that	  structure.	  A	  narrative	  
understanding	  of	  a	  narrative	  construction.	  (See	  Chapter	  7	  for	  an	  elaboration	  of	  
this	  point.)	  
3.	  Likewise,	  to	  report	  it	  is	  to	  find	  words	  or	  images	  to	  represent	  the	  construction	  
in	  all	  its	  phases.	  A	  snapshot	  will	  not	  do.	  (See	  Chapter	  8	  on	  ‘writing	  emotion’.)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Composition,	  construal,	  and	  recounting	  thus	  all	  involve	  narrative.	  These	  
three	  complementary	  perspectives	  on	  the	  same	  events,	  though	  analytically	  
distinguishable,	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  tease	  apart.	  My	  emphasis	  in	  this	  chapter,	  
however,	  is	  mainly	  on	  the	  first,	  the	  composition	  or	  construction	  of	  emotion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Emotions,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  are	  made	  up	  of	  components	  (events,	  appraisals,	  
feelings,	  expressions,	  actions)	  corresponding	  to	  ‘intentional	  structures’	  that	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enable	  us	  to	  distinguish,	  for	  example,	  envy	  from	  jealousy.	  Envy	  entails	  thinking	  
that	  someone	  else	  possesses	  something	  that	  we	  ourselves	  desire;	  jealousy,	  a	  fear	  
of	  dispossession	  by	  the	  other,	  a	  dread	  that	  letting	  be	  will	  mean	  letting	  go.	  Iago	  is	  
envious,	  Othello	  jealous.	  It	  is	  interesting	  but	  probably	  not	  crucial	  for	  their	  
distinctive	  phenomenology—what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  jealous	  or	  envious—that	  envy	  
and	  jealousy	  are	  lexically	  distinguished.	  In	  some	  languages	  they	  are	  not;	  in	  
contemporary	  English,	  especially	  among	  the	  young,	  the	  terms	  are	  often	  confused	  
(‘she	  was	  jealous	  of	  my	  dress’),	  though	  the	  underlying	  model	  of	  thoughts,	  
feelings	  and	  persons	  (envy	  two,	  jealousy	  three)	  remains	  clear.	  Minimal	  
behavioural	  scripts	  for	  jealousy	  and	  envy	  are	  probably	  found	  everywhere.	  Why?	  
Because	  loving,	  getting,	  wanting	  and	  losing	  figure	  among	  any	  group	  of	  human	  
beings,	  cradle	  to	  grave—beyond	  which	  the	  envious	  dead	  come	  back	  to	  haunt	  us.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  linking	  narrative	  to	  emotion,	  I	  am	  tapping	  into	  an	  ancient	  line	  of	  thought	  
that	  goes	  back	  to	  Aristotle,	  whose	  interest	  was	  in	  the	  emotive	  power	  of	  plot.	  In	  
an	  influential	  modern	  formulation,	  the	  psychologist	  Richard	  Lazarus	  (1991)	  used	  
the	  term	  ‘core	  relational	  themes’	  to	  denote	  the	  meanings	  attached	  to	  the	  relation	  
between	  person	  and	  environment	  that	  characterise	  and	  motivate	  particular	  
emotions.	  Recognisable	  across	  cultures,	  a	  putative	  universal,	  a	  core	  relational	  
theme	  is	  ‘a	  meaningful	  plot	  or	  scenario’	  (Lazarus	  1994:	  309):	  in	  the	  case	  of	  anger,	  
‘a	  demeaning	  offense	  against	  me	  and	  mine’;	  in	  sadness,	  the	  experience	  of	  ‘an	  
irrevocable	  loss’;	  in	  guilt,	  a	  moral	  transgression.	  Likewise,	  cultural	  psychologist	  
Richard	  Shweder	  (1994:	  37)	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘narrative	  structure	  that	  gives	  shape	  
and	  meaning	  to	  the	  emotion’,	  that	  is,	  the	  script	  or	  ‘story-­‐like	  interpretive	  scheme’	  
that	  assembles	  appraisals,	  feelings	  and	  actions	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  as	  ‘anger’,	  
‘sadness’	  and	  so	  forth.	  In	  philosophy,	  Peter	  Goldie	  (2000:	  144)	  relates	  emotions	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to	  the	  ‘narrative	  part	  of	  a	  person’s	  life’,	  that	  is	  the	  interleaving	  of	  past,	  present	  
and	  future	  in	  a	  tissue	  of	  expectations	  and	  concerns.	  	  
	  
Is	  narrative	  structure	  imposed	  or	  intrinsic?	  
In	  all	  these	  discussions	  a	  narrative-­‐like	  structure	  is	  seen	  as	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  
emotion	  as	  an	  event	  that	  unfolds	  through	  time	  and	  among	  persons	  pursuing	  
particular	  goals.	  Emotions	  differ,	  of	  course,	  in	  their	  duration.	  Surprise	  is	  brief,	  
love	  is	  long.	  Most	  theorists,	  seeking	  clarity,	  go	  for	  the	  brief,	  isolable	  emotions.	  
Staccato	  not	  legato.	  Yet	  those	  of	  greater	  weight	  in	  our	  lives,	  the	  joined	  up	  
emotions,	  have	  a	  more	  complex	  narrative	  structure;	  they	  are	  the	  hinges	  on	  which	  
our	  lives	  turn	  (Zweig	  2011/1939	  is	  a	  stunning	  example).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Among	  emotion	  theorists,	  Goldie	  is	  unusual	  in	  allowing	  considerable	  time-­‐
depth	  and	  personal	  resonance	  to	  what	  I	  shall	  call	  narrativity	  (‘the	  quality	  or	  
condition	  of	  presenting	  a	  narrative’	  [OED]),	  a	  concept	  that	  usefully	  spans	  
construction	  and	  representation.	  Emotions	  are	  not	  just	  flashpoints	  in	  the	  daily	  
round,	  ‘upheavals	  of	  thought’,	  in	  Nussbaum’s	  phrase;	  they	  may	  frame	  entire	  
sequences	  of	  behaviour	  and	  shape	  experience	  over	  the	  long	  run.	  Emotions	  have	  a	  
vintage,	  they	  are	  not—or	  not	  merely—products	  of	  the	  moment.	  The	  question	  is:	  
are	  we	  imagining	  shapes,	  like	  dragonish	  clouds,	  where	  none	  exists?	  No	  one	  
regards	  emotions	  as	  anything	  less	  than	  complex	  affairs;	  the	  issue	  is	  how	  they	  
hang	  together,	  by	  necessity	  or	  contingency,	  intention	  or	  retrospect?	  Is	  it	  
advantageous	  (adds	  the	  hedging	  ethnographer)	  to	  avoid	  being	  prescriptive?	  
Suppose	  that,	  in	  discerning	  structure,	  it’s	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘either/or’	  but	  of	  ‘more	  
or	  less’.	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  There’s	  a	  useful,	  if	  recherché,	  parallel	  with	  a	  controversy	  in	  historiography.	  
In	  advancing	  the	  case	  for	  a	  narrative	  approach	  to	  emotion	  we	  can	  learn	  
something	  from	  the	  historians’	  debates	  about	  whether	  narrative	  shape	  inheres	  
in	  events	  or	  is	  imposed	  retrospectively	  on	  mere	  succession.	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  need	  
not	  accept	  the	  contenders’	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  options.	  On	  the	  sceptical	  wing,	  Louis	  
Mink	  maintained	  that	  ‘narrative	  form	  in	  history,	  as	  in	  fiction,	  is	  an	  artifice,	  the	  
product	  of	  individual	  imagination’	  (Mink	  2001:	  218).	  We	  can	  recognise	  the	  force	  
of	  his	  point	  without	  accepting	  that	  temporal-­‐causal	  shape	  is	  entirely	  alien	  to	  
history-­‐as-­‐lived.	  (And	  what	  form	  of	  words,	  verbal	  or	  written,	  present	  tense	  or	  
past	  historic,	  is	  not	  artifice?	  When	  has	  reality	  excluded	  imagination?)	  Similarly,	  
we	  can	  accept,	  in	  part,	  Hayden	  White’s	  (2001:	  224)	  claim	  that	  ‘historical	  
situations	  do	  not	  have	  built	  into	  them	  intrinsic	  meaning	  in	  the	  way	  that	  literary	  
texts	  do’,	  not	  because	  historical	  situations	  as	  they	  happen	  are	  meaningless	  but	  
because	  the	  meanings	  of	  text	  and	  experience	  are	  of	  a	  different	  order.	  The	  
narrating	  of	  history	  responds	  to	  the	  intentionality	  of	  human	  action,	  the	  fact	  that	  
people	  act	  with	  a	  purpose	  in	  mind	  and	  with	  ideas	  and	  feelings	  about	  the	  world	  
they	  engage.	  Narrativity	  would	  only	  be	  alien	  to	  events	  were	  they	  to	  be	  lived	  by	  
thoughtless	  beings	  without	  intentions	  or	  emotions	  (cf.	  White	  1981,	  Kearney	  
2002).	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  realist	  wing,	  David	  Carr’s	  defence	  of	  narrative	  history—I	  quote	  his	  
conclusions,	  not	  his	  reasoning—resonates	  strongly	  with	  ethnography:	  
Narrative	  has	  not	  merely	  an	  epistemological	  but	  also	  an	  ontological	  value.	  That	  
is,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  ‘cognitive	  instrument’	  as	  Mink	  claimed—a	  primary	  way	  of	  
seeking,	  organizing	  and	  expressing	  our	  knowledge	  of	  a	  part	  of	  reality.	  It	  is	  
constitutive	  of	  our	  very	  being,	  it	  is	  our	  way	  of	  existing,	  of	  constituting	  	  
ourselves.	  (Carr	  2001:198)	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  Further	  support	  for	  the	  narrativity	  case—that	  our	  understanding	  responds	  
to	  inherent	  structure—comes	  from	  the	  seminal	  work	  of	  cognitive	  psychologist	  
Jerome	  Bruner.	  In	  Actual	  minds,	  possible	  worlds	  (1986)	  and	  Acts	  of	  meaning	  
(1990),	  Bruner	  sets	  out	  the	  case	  for	  narrative	  as	  one	  of	  two	  fundamental	  modes	  
of	  understanding,	  the	  other	  being	  the	  logical-­‐scientific	  approach	  that	  deals	  in	  
causal	  explanation,	  abstraction	  and	  generalisation.	  Narrative,	  he	  argues,	  is	  better	  
suited	  to	  the	  exploration	  of	  meaningful	  action	  than	  the	  external	  perspective	  of	  
positivist	  science	  that	  treats	  meaning	  as	  an	  ‘overlay’	  of	  ‘behaviour’.	  Bruner	  opts	  
for	  a	  cultural	  relativism	  in	  tune	  with	  American	  interpretive	  anthropology	  of	  the	  
time,	  which	  Clifford	  Geertz	  (his	  preferred	  anthropologist)	  had	  opposed	  to	  
positivist	  ‘explanation’.	  There’s	  a	  nice	  analogy.	  In	  the	  bad	  old	  days:	  
The	  causes	  of	  human	  behaviour	  were	  assumed	  to	  lie	  in	  [the]	  biological	  substrate.	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  instead	  is	  that	  culture	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  meaning	  within	  
culture	  are	  the	  proper	  causes	  of	  human	  action.	  The	  biological	  substrate,	  the	  so-­‐
called	  universals	  of	  human	  nature,	  is	  not	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  but,	  at	  most,	  a	  
constraint	  upon	  it	  or	  a	  condition	  for	  it.	  The	  engine	  in	  the	  car	  does	  not	  ‘cause’	  us	  to	  
drive	  to	  the	  supermarket	  for	  the	  week’s	  shopping,	  any	  more	  than	  our	  biological	  
reproductive	  system	  ‘causes’	  us	  with	  very	  high	  odds	  to	  marry	  somebody	  from	  
our	  own	  social	  class,	  ethnic	  group,	  and	  so	  on.	  Granted	  that	  without	  engine-­‐
powered	  cars	  we	  would	  not	  drive	  to	  supermarkets,	  nor	  perhaps	  would	  there	  be	  
marriage	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  reproductive	  systems.	  (Bruner	  1990:	  20-­‐21;	  original	  
emphasis)	  
	  
Few	  anthropologists	  today	  would	  see	  culture	  as	  a	  cause.	  But	  the	  larger	  point	  
holds.	  We	  can	  best	  understand	  social	  interactions	  through	  narrative	  because	  
sociality	  is	  shot	  through	  with	  intentions	  and	  meanings.	  More	  radically,	  Bruner	  
contends—like	  Carr—that	  ‘narrative	  structure	  is	  even	  inherent	  in	  the	  praxis	  of	  
social	  interaction	  before	  it	  achieves	  linguistic	  expression’	  (1990:	  77).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  might	  put	  Bruner’s	  position	  as	  follows.	  The	  tale	  needs	  no	  teller;	  it’s	  
written	  into	  the	  stream	  of	  life,	  the	  way	  we	  act	  and	  think.	  I	  would	  add	  ‘and	  feel’;	  
but,	  curiously,	  Bruner	  doesn’t	  extend	  his	  analysis	  to	  emotions	  per	  se,	  even	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though	  emotion	  episodes	  would,	  presumably,	  count	  as	  ‘acts	  of	  meaning’,	  his	  
principal	  focus.	  To	  be	  be	  sure,	  not	  all	  emotions	  qualify	  as	  actions	  (regret	  does	  
little),	  though	  most	  involve	  action	  tendencies—the	  urge	  to	  approach	  or	  
withdraw,	  strike	  or	  embrace.	  Nonetheless,	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  
narrative	  proper	  (stories,	  anecdotes,	  fiction),	  Bruner	  identifies	  criteria	  that	  apply	  
readily	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  emotion.	  	  
Narrative	  requires…four	  crucial	  grammatical	  constituents	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  effectively	  
carried	  out.	  It	  requires,	  first,	  a	  means	  for	  emphasizing	  human	  action	  or	  
‘agentivity’—action	  directed	  toward	  goals	  controlled	  by	  agents.	  It	  requires,	  
secondly,	  that	  a	  sequential	  order	  be	  established	  and	  maintained—that	  events	  and	  
states	  be	  ‘linearized’	  in	  a	  standard	  way.	  Narrative,	  thirdly,	  also	  requires	  a	  
sensitivity	  to	  what	  is	  canonical	  [ie.	  usual]	  and	  what	  violates	  canonicality	  in	  
human	  interaction.	  Finally,	  narrative	  requires	  something	  approximating	  a	  
narrator’s	  perspective:	  it	  cannot	  in	  the	  jargon	  of	  narratology,	  be	  ‘voiceless’.	  
(1990:	  77;	  my	  italics)	  
	  
How	  might	  these	  features	  of	  narrative	  apply	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  emotion	  
(distinct	  from	  its	  retelling	  or	  narration)?	  
1	  Agentivity	  corresponds	  to	  a	  focus	  in	  appraisal	  on	  the	  cause	  or	  source	  of	  the	  
eliciting	  event,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  attribution	  of	  blame	  in	  anger	  or	  guilt,	  the	  
kindness	  that	  leads	  to	  gratitude,	  the	  threat	  implied	  in	  fear.	  
2	  Sequential	  order	  corresponds	  to	  the	  time-­‐bound	  property	  of	  emotions	  as	  
initiated	  by	  changes	  in	  circumstances	  and	  marked	  by	  phases	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  
the	  episode.	  This	  is	  a	  critical	  difference	  between	  an	  emotion	  and	  a	  mood.	  	  
3	  Violations	  of	  the	  canonical—reversals	  of	  fortune,	  breaches	  in	  the	  quiet	  surface	  
of	  everyday	  life—are	  what	  trigger	  prototypical	  emotions	  like	  rage	  and	  disgust.	  
Emotions	  are	  prompted	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  relation	  of	  self	  to	  environment	  that	  
impinge	  on	  our	  concerns	  (Frijda	  1986,	  Lazarus	  1991).	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4	  Narrator’s	  perspective	  corresponds	  to	  the	  egocentric	  perspective	  of	  emotional	  
appraisal,	  the	  me-­‐focus	  that	  identifies	  changes	  relevant	  to	  one’s	  well-­‐being.	  In	  
narrative	  theory	  this	  property	  is	  called	  focalization.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  More	  recent	  attempts	  to	  set	  criteria	  for	  narrative	  could	  equally	  be	  applied	  to	  
emotion.	  David	  Herman	  proposes	  that	  prototypical	  narratives	  represent:	  
(i)	  a	  structured	  time-­‐course	  of	  particularized	  events	  which	  introduces	  (ii)	  
disruption	  or	  disequilibrium	  into	  storytellers’	  and	  interpreters’	  mental	  model	  of	  
the	  world	  evoked	  by	  the	  narrative….conveying	  (iii)	  what	  it’s	  like	  to	  live	  through	  
that	  disruption,	  that	  is,	  the	  ‘qualia’	  (or	  felt	  subjective	  awareness)	  of	  real	  or	  
imagined	  consciousness	  undergoing	  the	  disruptive	  experience.	  (2007:	  9)	  
	  
In	  like	  manner,	  classical	  narratologists	  like	  Todorov	  (and	  before	  him	  Propp)	  
have	  focussed	  on	  the	  disruption	  that	  spurs	  the	  narration.	  
Todorov	  argued	  that	  narratives	  prototypically	  follow	  a	  trajectory	  leading	  from	  
an	  initial	  state	  of	  equilibrium,	  through	  a	  phase	  of	  disequilibrium,	  to	  an	  endpoint	  
at	  which	  equilibrium	  is	  restored	  (on	  a	  different	  footing)	  because	  of	  intermediary	  
events.	  (Herman	  2007:	  10)	  	  	  
	  
Which	  would	  be	  a	  pretty	  good	  definition	  of	  an	  emotion!	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  	  
independently	  of	  narratologists,	  emotion	  theorists,	  point	  to	  the	  eliciting	  event,	  
the	  appraisal	  of	  harm	  or	  benefit,	  the	  subjective	  feelings	  or	  qualia,	  the	  
transformation	  of	  consciousness	  and	  bodily	  state,	  and	  the	  restorative	  or	  
consummating	  action.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  These	  striking	  parallels	  do	  not	  justify	  a	  blunt	  claim	  that	  emotions	  are	  
narratives—they	  don't	  represent	  anything,	  even	  if	  they	  communicate	  a	  ‘story’.	  
The	  claim	  is	  rather	  that	  emotions	  resemble	  narratives	  in	  structure—a	  
resemblance	  underplayed	  by	  most	  writers	  on	  these	  matters	  despite	  frequent	  
recourse	  to	  literary	  examples	  (Oatley	  2012	  a	  notable	  exception).	  Given	  the	  
common	  factors	  in	  how	  emotions	  and	  narratives	  are	  put	  together	  it’s	  hardly	  
surprising	  that	  literature—the	  realist	  novel,	  but	  also	  drama	  and	  narrative	  non-­‐
	   120	  
fiction—offers	  some	  of	  the	  sharpest	  insights	  into	  the	  construction	  of	  emotion,	  as	  
well	  as	  lessons	  for	  the	  ethnographer,	  that	  conflicted	  figure	  whom	  Edmund	  Leach	  
saw	  as	  novelist	  manqué.	  Nor	  is	  it	  surprising	  that	  the	  narrative	  arts	  deal	  mainly	  in	  
emotion.	  They	  work	  with	  the	  same	  ingredients.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  7	  I	  present	  some	  literary	  examples.	  But	  let’s	  first	  consider	  what	  
anthropology	  can	  do.	  My	  focus	  here	  will	  be	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  emotion	  rather	  
than	  on	  the	  way	  we	  understand	  and	  report,	  though	  obviously	  these	  perspectives	  
overlap,	  as	  will	  their	  illustrations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
Narrative	  and	  social	  dramas:	  restoring	  the	  detail	  
The	  novelist	  and	  the	  ethnographer	  find	  common	  cause	  in	  a	  special	  concern	  with	  
particulars,	  the	  odds	  and	  ends	  that	  get	  left	  behind	  in	  theoretical	  discussion	  as	  
excess	  baggage.	  Without	  a	  firm	  grasp	  of	  the	  actuality	  there	  is	  no	  safe	  step	  to	  
cross-­‐cultural	  comparison,	  let	  alone	  grand	  theory.	  In	  developing	  arguments,	  the	  
well-­‐worked	  example	  scores	  over	  the	  matrix	  of	  variables,	  the	  flow	  chart	  or	  the	  
summary	  formula.	  Such	  is	  the	  lesson	  of	  fieldwork.	  Yet	  disciplinary	  history	  is	  
haunted	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  incompleteness,	  the	  shadow	  of	  things	  left	  out.	  Which	  
perhaps	  explains	  why	  each	  new	  theoretical	  movement	  tends	  to	  bring	  a	  recovery,	  
or	  at	  least	  a	  recognition,	  of	  what	  its	  predecessor	  ignored.	  Paradigms	  get	  
abandoned	  not	  when	  their	  conceptual	  flaws	  are	  exposed	  but	  when	  discards	  find	  
a	  place	  in	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  theory,	  or	  when	  shots	  from	  afar	  are	  seen	  to	  bear	  too	  high	  
a	  cost	  in	  collateral	  damage.	  Emotions	  are	  the	  first	  casualties	  of	  anthropological	  
theorizing.	  How	  then	  to	  put	  them	  back	  in?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  his	  masterwork,	  The	  Emotions,	  Frijda	  calls	  the	  price	  of	  generalisation	  
‘information	  loss’,	  for	  which	  reason	  he	  favours	  ‘descriptive	  analysis’	  over	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‘reduction	  to	  basic	  dimensions’	  (1986:	  186).	  One	  direct	  way	  of	  recovering	  the	  
information—more	  favoured	  by	  contemporary	  philosophers	  than	  
psychologists—is	  through	  introspection.	  To	  observe	  our	  own	  unfolding	  
emotions,	  catch	  them	  on	  the	  wing,	  is	  to	  glimpse	  what	  escapes	  the	  booth	  in	  the	  
lab.	  But	  as	  Frijda	  cautions,	  ‘introspection	  is	  an	  act	  of	  consciousness	  that	  has	  
awareness	  as	  its	  object,	  and	  not	  the	  object	  that	  was	  intended	  in	  the	  first	  place’	  
(187).	  To	  think	  about	  your	  emotions	  while	  having	  them,	  to	  scan	  your	  anger	  
instead	  of	  your	  offender,	  is	  to	  lose	  the	  relation	  between	  subject	  and	  object,	  ‘the	  
relationship	  with	  the	  world’	  which	  is	  definitive	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  emotion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  For	  the	  anthropologist,	  too,	  introspection	  of	  emotion	  (‘reflexivity’)	  cannot	  
recover	  what	  generalisation	  misses.	  (Frijda’s	  point	  bears	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  using	  
our	  own	  emotions	  as	  an	  ethnographic	  resource.)	  Yet	  pure	  description	  is	  not	  
enough.	  To	  advance	  knowledge,	  rather	  than	  merely	  to	  pique	  curiosity,	  what	  we	  
need	  is	  a	  theoretical	  handle	  on	  the	  vicissitudes	  of	  emotions	  in	  action.	  But	  where	  
can	  we	  find	  it?	  One	  proven	  means	  of	  investigating	  the	  dynamics	  of	  social	  
processes	  is	  the	  ‘extended	  case	  method’	  developed	  by	  the	  Manchester	  school	  of	  
anthropology.	  Mid-­‐century	  ethnographers—notably	  Max	  Gluckman	  and	  Victor	  
Turner—followed	  factional	  disputes	  and	  witchcraft	  trials	  through	  all	  their	  twists	  
and	  turns	  to	  show	  how	  structural	  tensions	  between	  generations,	  leadership	  
contenders,	  and	  organisational	  principles	  could	  be	  explored	  through	  ‘social	  
dramas’	  (Turner	  1957,	  1981).	  Rather	  than	  looking	  for	  structural	  contradictions	  
in	  a	  static	  framework,	  as	  in	  standard	  functionalism,	  you	  followed	  tensions	  as	  
they	  emerged	  in	  action,	  diagnosing	  the	  stress	  points,	  for	  example,	  between	  
matrilineal	  descent	  and	  patriarchal	  authority.	  From	  contrarieties	  issued	  conflicts	  
that	  unfolded	  in	  predictable	  ways:	  the	  pattern	  in	  the	  flux.	  The	  success	  of	  the	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method	  owed	  much	  to	  the	  manifold	  form	  of	  relationships	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  
communities	  observed	  by	  anthropologists	  of	  the	  time.	  People	  were	  connected	  
and	  divided—but	  always	  related—at	  many	  levels,	  through	  kinship,	  political	  
alliance,	  witchcraft	  accusations,	  land	  tenure,	  religion.	  Breaches	  at	  one	  level	  were	  
spanned	  at	  another.	  Patrilineal	  foes	  were	  matrilineal	  friends.	  Like	  the	  subplots	  of	  
a	  TV	  soap,	  with	  its	  quarrelsome	  small-­‐town	  cast,	  the	  social	  drama	  develops	  
through	  these	  breakings	  and	  mendings.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  But	  does	  the	  extended	  case	  method	  work	  with	  emotion?	  The	  tentative	  
answer	  is	  yes.	  Tentative	  because—somewhat	  surprisingly—it	  hasn’t	  often	  been	  
tried,	  and	  because	  anthropology	  has	  new	  priorities	  in	  a	  globalising	  world	  where	  
interconnexion	  flourishes	  at	  higher	  levels	  (cyberspace,	  the	  imagined	  
community).	  The	  method	  can	  extend	  only	  so	  far.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Somebody	  who	  did	  try	  is	  A.	  L.	  Epstein,	  whose	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  life	  (1992)	  
remains	  one	  of	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  ethnographic	  studies	  with	  an	  emotional	  focus.	  
Epstein’s	  rather	  old-­‐fashioned	  book	  was	  ignored	  in	  the	  emerging	  ‘anthropology	  
of	  emotion’	  of	  the	  1990s.	  It	  came	  out	  when	  more	  exciting	  approaches—social	  
constructionism,	  ethnopsychology,	  person-­‐centered	  anthropology—were	  in	  
vogue.	  And	  it	  drew	  on	  a	  biological	  theory	  of	  emotion	  at	  a	  time	  when,	  in	  the	  social	  
sciences,	  the	  word	  biology	  required	  scare	  quotes,	  as	  if	  the	  natural	  sciences	  were	  
a	  Western	  folk	  theory.	  (The	  scientist	  in	  question,	  Silvan	  Tomkins,	  has	  had	  a	  
strange	  afterlife	  in	  so-­‐called	  ‘affect	  theory’,	  principally	  in	  Cultural	  Studies.)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Epstein’s	  ethnography	  of	  the	  Tolai	  people	  of	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  focuses,	  as	  
did	  his	  Manchester	  colleagues,	  on	  local	  disputes.	  But	  his	  aim	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  
distinctive	  cultural	  shape	  and	  social	  ramifications	  of	  what	  he	  calls,	  following	  
Tomkins,	  ‘affect’,	  a	  term	  he	  uses	  synonymously	  with	  ‘emotion’.	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My	  hope	  is…to	  show	  through	  the	  evidence	  of	  dispute	  material	  some	  of	  the	  kinds	  
of	  emotion	  that	  are	  generated	  within	  particular	  relationships	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
to	  illustrate	  the	  emotional	  tone	  of	  these	  relationships.	  In	  addition,	  I	  believe	  that	  
the	  use	  of	  material	  of	  this	  kind	  has	  a	  further	  value	  of	  its	  own:	  first,	  insofar	  as	  any	  
dispute	  is	  concerned	  with	  contested	  aims,	  in	  exposing	  the	  emotional	  roots	  as	  
distinct	  from	  the	  legal	  basis	  of	  those	  claims;	  and,	  second,	  in	  demonstrating	  how	  
appeal	  to	  the	  emotions	  can	  play	  a	  central	  and	  regular	  part	  in	  dispute-­‐management	  
itself.	  (Epstein	  1992:	  117;	  italics	  added)	  
	  
What	  was	  new	  about	  this?	  The	  first	  objective	  recalled	  functionalism,	  in	  which	  
stereotyped	  sentiments	  defined	  structured	  relationships.	  It	  also	  recalled	  the	  
Culture	  and	  Personality	  work	  of	  Bateson	  and	  Mead,	  whose	  indefatigable	  mission,	  
wherever	  they	  alighted,	  was	  to	  test	  the	  emotional	  temperature,	  the	  ethos	  of	  the	  
community,	  and	  to	  uncover	  ‘emotional	  roots’	  in	  patterns	  of	  child	  rearing.	  
Epstein’s	  last-­‐named	  objective	  was	  more	  firmly	  contemporary.	  Although	  
working	  to	  very	  different	  agendas,	  other	  students	  of	  emotion	  in	  Oceania	  were	  
also	  exploring	  the	  pragmatics	  of	  emotion	  discourses	  (Lutz	  1988,	  White	  1992).	  
Feeling	  was	  saying	  was	  doing.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  So	  the	  aims	  were	  not	  original,	  nor	  was	  the	  method.	  But	  the	  lasting	  interest	  of	  
the	  study	  lies	  in	  its	  descriptions.	  In	  them	  we	  recover	  some	  of	  the	  effectual	  detail	  
that	  functionalism	  had	  scorned	  in	  quest	  of	  principle:	  the	  life	  of	  the	  social	  
organism,	  where	  functionalists	  had	  seen	  only	  structure.	  Emotions	  emerge,	  more	  
roundedly,	  as	  vital	  ever-­‐changing	  aspects	  of	  relationships:	  motivating,	  
commentating	  on,	  and	  directing	  social	  action.	  As	  Epstein	  demonstrates,	  it’s	  not	  
enough	  to	  report	  the	  shame-­‐based	  modesty	  that	  inhibits	  a	  Tolai	  brother	  and	  
sister,	  to	  show	  the	  affective	  tug	  of	  matrilineal	  authority,	  or	  to	  make	  emotion	  a	  
mere	  function	  of	  the	  social	  order.	  You	  have	  to	  trace	  how	  appropriate	  sentiments	  
emerge	  in	  action	  and	  how	  emotions	  with	  different	  developmental	  origins	  and	  
countervailing	  tendencies	  come	  into	  play.	  You	  have	  to	  attend	  to	  their	  narrative	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structure.	  In	  one	  case	  study,	  a	  man	  beats	  and	  shames	  his	  wife	  when	  she	  helps	  her	  
brother	  in	  his	  taro	  garden.	  He	  is	  jealous	  of	  her	  attention	  but	  also	  resentful	  of	  the	  
stronger	  productive	  ties	  between	  brother	  and	  sister	  in	  the	  matrilineal	  group	  and	  
of	  his	  own	  exclusion	  as	  an	  affine	  (1992:	  117-­‐123).	  The	  public	  assault—he	  tears	  
off	  her	  clothes	  in	  front	  of	  the	  brother—offends	  the	  sibling	  taboo,	  colouring	  the	  
quarrel	  and	  reaching	  into	  deeper	  emotional	  territory.	  At	  a	  tribal	  moot,	  the	  
brother	  cautiously	  disavows	  anger	  (his	  feelings	  assuaged	  by	  compensation)	  and	  
keeps	  up	  a	  show	  of	  affinal	  respect;	  but	  third	  parties	  reproach	  the	  husband	  for	  
lack	  of	  varmari,	  a	  word	  meaning	  ‘love’	  and	  ‘care’.	  It	  is	  this	  long-­‐term	  sentiment	  
that	  characterises	  the	  married	  relation	  and	  which	  lends	  it	  stability	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
competing	  matrilineal	  claims.	  In	  another	  case,	  a	  dying	  wife	  appeals	  to	  her	  
husband	  to	  care	  properly	  for	  the	  children	  and	  remember	  ‘our	  love’—the	  word,	  
the	  sentiment,	  carrying	  moral	  force	  and	  existential	  value	  beyond	  conventional	  
duty	  (123).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  What	  strikes	  us	  about	  these	  vignettes	  is	  not	  that	  they	  confirm	  or	  defy	  
stereotype	  (So	  what?	  we	  should	  ask),	  but	  that	  emotions	  are	  the	  very	  substance	  of	  
the	  encounters.	  They	  have	  a	  narrative	  shape	  it	  is	  the	  ethnographer’s	  task	  to	  
reveal.	  In	  being	  owned	  by	  the	  participants—as	  actors	  in	  a	  ‘social	  drama’	  rather	  
than	  ciphers	  of	  structure—emotions	  transcend	  simple	  scripts.	  They	  feed	  off	  and	  
respond	  to	  social	  structure	  constructively,	  rather	  than	  merely	  serving	  it.	  And	  
they	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  reflection	  and	  debate.	  What	  are	  the	  right	  emotions	  in	  
this	  situation,	  for	  this	  or	  that	  person?	  How	  can	  hearts	  be	  suitably	  stirred	  or	  
calmed?	  In	  social	  dramas,	  as	  Turner	  noted,	  ‘whether	  juridical	  or	  ritual	  processes	  
of	  redress	  are	  invoked	  against	  mounting	  crises,	  the	  result	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  what	  
one	  might	  call	  social	  or	  plural	  reflexivity,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  group	  tries	  to	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scrutinize,	  portray,	  understand,	  and	  then	  act	  on	  itself’	  (1981:	  152;	  original	  
emphasis).	  Turner’s	  eye	  was	  steadily	  on	  structural	  principles	  and	  their	  affective	  
underpinnings;	  but	  in	  Tolai	  social	  dramas,	  as	  in	  Java	  and	  Nias,	  the	  reflexive	  focus	  
is	  on	  the	  play	  of	  living	  emotion	  and	  on	  deliberate	  acts	  of	  emotion	  work.	  The	  
dramas	  seem	  to	  say:	  Sort	  out	  the	  emotions	  and	  the	  rest	  will	  fall	  into	  place.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  At	  least,	  that	  is	  how	  it	  looks,	  how	  it	  feels,	  and	  how	  it	  pans	  out.	  (For	  a	  fuller	  
example,	  see	  Beatty	  2015:	  Chapter	  16.)	  Niha	  heart-­‐speech	  is	  a	  virtuoso	  riff	  on	  
this	  theme,	  a	  relentless	  plucking	  of	  heart	  strings,	  while	  Javanese	  efforts	  aim	  at	  
smoothing	  out	  emotions	  to	  avoid	  social	  dramas.	  When	  trouble	  looms	  and	  the	  
unavoidable	  erupts,	  again	  it’s	  emotions—shame,	  pernah,	  anger—that	  are	  the	  
point	  of	  interest,	  the	  issues	  to	  be	  worked	  through.	  To	  get	  them	  right,	  to	  make	  up	  
or	  calm	  down,	  is	  to	  rearrange	  persons	  and	  situations,	  to	  tweak	  the	  narrative	  
constituents,	  to	  restore	  the	  status	  quo.	  ‘It	  is	  not	  technical	  skill	  or	  special	  
brilliance	  that	  the	  Arapesh	  demand	  either	  in	  men	  or	  in	  women,’	  wrote	  Margaret	  
Mead;	  ‘it	  is	  rather	  correct	  emotions,	  a	  character	  that	  finds	  in	  co-­‐operative	  and	  
cherishing	  activity	  its	  most	  perfect	  expression’	  (Mead	  1935:	  142).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Epstein	  brings	  this	  process	  of	  emotional	  adjustment	  into	  view,	  as	  well	  as	  
indicating	  what	  cannot	  be	  brought	  to	  light.	  For	  his	  larger	  point,	  which	  takes	  time	  
to	  make—and	  patience	  in	  the	  reader—is	  that	  in	  the	  ‘multistranded	  relations’	  of	  
kin-­‐based	  communities,	  surface	  disturbances	  have	  deep	  and	  obscure	  roots.	  ‘An	  
observer	  following	  the	  case	  sees	  clearly	  enough	  that	  the	  parties	  are	  deeply	  
aggrieved,	  but	  what	  is	  upsetting	  them	  may	  not	  always	  be	  immediately	  plain	  nor	  
easy	  to	  disentangle’	  (128).	  A	  passionate	  dispute	  over	  some	  trivial	  offence	  will	  
often	  have	  its	  origins	  ‘in	  the	  complex	  and	  frequently	  conflicting	  feelings	  
generated	  within	  a	  given	  set	  of	  culturally	  defined	  relationships’	  (130).	  The	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healing	  process	  of	  local	  justice	  must	  engage	  those	  deeper	  feelings	  and	  their	  
sources.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  don’t	  all	  live	  in	  tribal	  communities,	  to	  be	  sure;	  but	  what	  we	  bring	  to	  an	  
encounter	  from	  our	  scattered	  relationships	  and	  clinging	  pasts	  must	  affect	  how	  
we	  respond	  to	  the	  present	  challenge,	  whether	  as	  actors	  or	  observers.	  Our	  
emotions	  have	  a	  historical	  dimension,	  as	  psychoanalysis	  has	  always	  insisted.	  The	  
hitch	  these	  days	  is	  in	  the	  unavailability	  of	  the	  data	  and	  the	  relative	  thinness	  of	  
the	  encounter,	  not	  in	  the	  invisible	  nexus	  of	  causes	  and	  meanings	  (a	  perennial	  
problem).	  So,	  at	  least,	  it	  must	  seem	  to	  the	  virtual	  ethnographer,	  the	  student	  of	  
globalisation,	  and	  the	  corporate	  anthropologist.	  Either	  way,	  in	  the	  tribal	  village	  
or	  the	  dark	  web,	  the	  writer	  who	  skimps	  narrative,	  like	  the	  theorist	  who	  deals	  in	  
snapshots	  or	  simulations,	  makes	  light	  of	  the	  emotional	  freight.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Epstein	  takes	  the	  extended	  case	  method	  as	  far	  as	  it	  will	  go,	  and	  then	  a	  bit	  
further.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  once	  you	  start	  pulling	  on	  a	  strand	  it’s	  hard	  to	  stop—
a	  predicament	  endemic	  to	  ethnography	  because	  fieldwork	  always	  begins	  in	  
medias	  res.	  	  
There	  can	  have	  been	  few	  domestic	  disputes	  that	  came	  before	  the	  village	  forum	  
that	  did	  not	  have	  a	  long	  and	  complex	  history	  or	  did	  not	  build	  on	  old	  resentments.	  
But	  little	  of	  this	  background	  was	  likely	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  hearing	  
itself.	  Much	  of	  it	  of	  course	  was	  well	  known	  to	  many	  of	  the	  villagers	  who	  made	  up	  
the	  audience,	  and	  into	  it	  the	  present	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  of	  the	  
protagonists	  could	  now	  be	  slotted	  (158).	  	  
	  
The	  real	  story	  is	  always	  some	  way	  back	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  emotions	  on	  parade,	  
whether	  long-­‐prepared,	  situational,	  individual	  or	  collective,	  have	  more	  than	  a	  
structural	  and	  incidental	  context;	  they	  have	  roots,	  which	  is	  why	  Epstein	  finds	  
himself	  constantly	  surprised	  by	  bursts	  of	  anger	  and	  upwellings	  of	  grief.	  Each	  
dispute	  taps	  into	  older	  disputes,	  reviving	  hard	  feelings,	  slights	  and	  slurs	  that	  go	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back	  decades.	  A	  woman	  brings	  a	  case	  against	  her	  maternal	  grandmother	  for	  
driving	  away	  her	  brothers	  and	  speaking	  ill	  of	  their	  dead	  mother	  (1992:	  153-­‐
162).	  As	  accusations	  multiply	  and	  insults	  fly,	  a	  history	  of	  bridewealth	  
contributions	  paid,	  diverted,	  and	  denied	  opens	  up	  a	  chronicle	  of	  opportunism	  
and	  neglect.	  But	  the	  facts	  reassembled	  for	  judgment	  suddenly	  give	  way	  before	  
long-­‐buried	  grief	  that	  has	  all	  parties,	  even	  the	  mediator,	  weeping.	  And	  when	  
Epstein	  pulls	  on	  this	  strand	  it	  leads	  in	  a	  quite	  different	  direction,	  losing	  itself	  in	  a	  
tangle	  of	  emotionally-­‐charged	  dealings	  with	  tambu,	  the	  shell	  money	  which	  Tolai	  
handle,	  hoard	  and	  release	  with	  ‘compulsive	  interest’.	  As	  both	  a	  medium	  of	  
exchange	  and	  a	  sacred	  money	  (the	  word	  is	  cognate	  with	  taboo)	  tambu	  links	  
bridewealth	  partners	  and	  the	  living	  with	  the	  dead.	  A	  deceased	  relative	  cannot	  
enter	  the	  Abode	  of	  Spirits	  until	  the	  accumulated	  tambu	  are	  dispersed,	  in	  an	  odd	  
aggressive	  splurge,	  among	  surviving	  kin.	  In	  Epstein’s	  literally	  interminable	  case	  
(those	  strands),	  the	  plaintiff’s	  parents	  had	  died	  before	  reaching	  their	  full	  estate	  
and	  before	  their	  proper	  obligations	  could	  be	  discharged;	  hence	  the	  meeting	  
breaks	  down	  when	  emotions	  linked	  to	  the	  circulation	  of	  tambu	  are	  triggered.	  
Epstein	  follows	  through	  with	  a	  Freudian	  excursus	  into	  tambu-­‐love.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It’s	  like	  a	  story	  told	  backwards,	  as	  deep	  as	  memory.	  And	  it	  presents	  a	  
problem	  that	  is	  not	  just	  empirical	  but	  theoretical	  and,	  beyond	  that,	  literary.	  A	  
concern	  with	  the	  constitution	  of	  emotions	  turns	  into	  a	  problem	  of	  selection	  and	  
reporting.	  The	  puzzle	  is	  not	  simply	  where	  will	  it	  end,	  but	  how	  did	  it	  begin?	  Those	  
aspects	  of	  narrativity	  I	  earlier	  applied	  to	  emotion—agency,	  sequence,	  breach,	  
focalization—are	  all	  in	  evidence	  as	  the	  dramas	  play	  out,	  but	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
each	  case	  seem	  arbitrary.	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  In	  one	  of	  his	  prefaces,	  Henry	  James	  remarked	  that	  ‘really,	  universally,	  
relations	  stop	  nowhere,	  and	  the	  exquisite	  problem	  of	  the	  artist	  is	  eternally	  but	  to	  
draw,	  by	  a	  geometry	  of	  his	  own,	  the	  circle	  within	  which	  they	  shall	  happily	  appear	  
to	  do	  so.	  He	  is	  in	  the	  perpetual	  predicament	  that	  the	  continuity	  of	  things	  is	  the	  
whole	  matter	  for	  him’	  (1984:	  1041).	  In	  their	  selective	  handling	  of	  the	  data	  and	  
their	  modelling	  of	  cases,	  ethnographies	  are,	  in	  this	  sense	  fictional;	  even—one	  
thinks	  of	  The	  Nuer—geometrically	  exquisite.	  There’s	  an	  obvious	  trade-­‐off	  
between	  detail	  and	  explanatory	  power.	  In	  getting	  the	  story	  right,	  identifying	  
what’s	  significant,	  it’s	  easy	  to	  let	  the	  particulars	  overwhelm	  the	  general;	  but	  in	  
limiting	  detail,	  we	  risk	  losing	  the	  reality	  altogether—Frijda’s	  information	  loss—
and	  end	  up	  explaining	  nothing.	  In	  dealing	  with	  emotions,	  how	  do	  you	  know	  
what’s	  essential	  and	  what’s	  contingent,	  especially	  when	  so	  much	  is	  out	  of	  reach?	  
In	  drawing	  the	  causal	  boundary	  around	  a	  complicated	  case,	  Epstein	  settles	  on	  
material	  factors—the	  dues	  of	  brideprice	  and	  marriage—as	  his	  springs	  and	  
motives;	  but	  he	  doesn’t	  leave	  it	  there.	  Perhaps	  the	  concern	  with	  surface	  and	  
depth	  should	  have	  sounded	  the	  alarm.	  In	  Epstein’s	  hands	  it	  leads	  not	  to	  
ethnographic	  scepticism—how	  can	  we	  know	  about	  the	  past	  and	  make	  good	  on	  
our	  ignorance?—but	  back	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  faith.	  That	  the	  powerful	  feelings	  
surrounding	  tambu	  are	  not	  self-­‐explanatory	  we	  can	  readily	  accept;	  yet	  for	  most	  
readers	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  Viennese	  verities	  at	  this	  point	  will	  no	  longer	  do:	  the	  
tropical	  hut	  is	  too	  far	  from	  the	  brocaded	  Freudian	  couch.	  Assertions	  that	  the	  
affective	  load	  of	  tambu	  derives	  from	  ‘anal	  erotism’,	  and	  that	  the	  enormous	  hoops	  
of	  shell	  money	  displayed	  at	  ceremonies	  are	  giant	  anuses	  or	  vaginas,	  are	  claims	  
unsupported	  by	  developmental	  evidence	  (193-­‐197)—a	  bizarre	  twist	  in	  the	  tale.	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If	  the	  story	  runs	  out,	  as	  fieldwork	  stories	  do,	  better	  to	  recognise	  the	  limits	  of	  
ethnography	  than	  fall	  back	  on	  supposition	  and	  cliché.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Where	  does	  that	  leave	  us?	  The	  case	  for	  narrative	  established,	  we	  have	  come	  
some	  way	  in	  sketching	  its	  ethnographic	  value;	  but	  whole	  regions	  of	  emotional	  life	  
remain	  elusive	  –	  not	  just	  the	  traditional	  territory	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  the	  suburbs	  
of	  the	  soul,	  but	  the	  historical	  hinterland	  and	  living	  reality,	  the	  life	  incarnate.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  extended	  case	  method	  might	  provide	  a	  mapping	  of	  local	  emotional	  
worlds,	  but	  it	  can’t	  cope	  with	  idiosyncrasy,	  temperament	  and	  character,	  or	  with	  
the	  invisible	  branching	  past,	  all	  of	  which	  infiltrate	  emotional	  encounters.	  It	  	  
shows	  us	  how	  emotions	  are	  triggered	  and	  framed,	  but	  nothing	  about	  their	  
‘phenomenology’,	  what	  it	  means	  and	  feels	  like	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  named	  Tolai	  facing	  
defeat,	  triumph	  or	  humiliation.	  What	  works	  for	  village	  feuds	  and	  tribal	  moots	  
undershoots	  with	  emotion.	  A	  thicker	  narrative	  is	  needed,	  a	  firmer	  grip	  on	  its	  
personal	  and	  biographical	  constitution.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  develop	  an	  
analytical	  perspective	  on	  the	  biographical	  dimension	  of	  emotional	  episodes,	  
show	  what	  happens	  when	  this	  is	  ignored,	  and	  finish	  with	  two	  extended	  examples	  
of	  emotionally	  vital	  ethnography.	  	  
	  
